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Abstract 
 
Proponents of corporate environmental responsibility argue that corporations shortchange 
shareholders by investing too little in environmental responsibility. They claim that corporations 
can improve their financial performance by increasing their investment in environmental 
responsibility. Opponents of corporate social responsibility argue that corporations shortchange 
shareholders by investing too much in environmental responsibility. They claim that corporations 
can improve their financial performance by reducing their investment in environmental 
responsibility. Yet others claim that corporations serve their shareholders well by investing just 
enough in social responsibility, not too little and not too much. If so, corporations increase their 
investment in environmental responsibility when an increase improves financial performance and 
reduce their investment in environmental responsibility when a decrease improves financial 
performance. Our evidence is consistent with this last claim. We find that the behavior of 
corporations is consistent with the claim that they act in the interest of shareholders, increasing 
or decreasing their investment in environmental responsibility as necessary to improve their 
financial performance. 
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Do Corporations Invest Enough in Environmental Responsibility? 
 
 BP's disastrous oil spill into the Gulf of Mexico and Goldman Sachs' hand in the 
disastrous global financial crisis prompted critical reflection on corporate social responsibility 
and its tradeoffs with corporate profits. BP's "Beyond Petroleum" campaign positioned it as the 
leading environmentally responsible energy company before its slogan turned into a bitter punch 
line. Goldman's "10,000 Women" project promised business education of women, before it was 
revealed that Goldman's business practices serve as poor foundations for business education.  
Freeland (2010) concluded that the BP and Goldman business disasters were "facilitated by the 
mini-industry of corporate social responsibility -- known as CSR by those in the trade -- a fetish 
encouraged by the philanthropies that feed off it and funded by the corporate executives who 
have found that it serves their bottom line."  
How do corporations balance profits and social responsibility? And how should we, as a 
society, assure a proper balance? We find the corporations are not willing to sacrifice profits for 
environmental responsibility. Corporations adjust their investment in social responsibility up or 
down to maximize profits, adding to their investment when additions increase profits and 
subtracting from their investment when subtractions increase profits. The events of BP and 
Goldman indicate that corporate investments in social responsibility might be too low when 
considered by society, even if they are considered adequate by corporations. This implies that 
government has a crucial role in assuring that corporations increase their investment in social 
responsibility to levels adequate for society. 
Proponents of corporate environmental responsibility and, more generally, corporate social 
responsibility, often claim that corporations face no tradeoff between improving their corporate 
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social responsibility and increasing their financial performance. They rely on studies such as those 
by Russo and Fouts (1997) and Guenster et al. (2006) who find that high corporate environmental 
ratings are associated with high financial performance. Russo and Fouts concluded that 
“[m]anagers who… resist and contest pressures for environmental improvement risk not only a 
profound loss of productive energy, but also a bottom-line loss of equal proportions.” (p. 554). 
Guenster et al. concluded that “managers have little reason to worry that an environmental policy 
conflicts with the company’s primary objectives.” (p. 25). Weber et al. (2005) stated that "Today, 
the positive correlation between environmental performance and financial performance is widely 
accepted, even though the strength of the correlation and its genesis are still often unclear." 
The theory underlying the no-tradeoff claim is dubious because the marginal returns of 
investments in corporate social responsibility diminish as the quantity of investments increase. 
As Kolstad (2007) wrote, "Put simply, company profits do not increase indefinitely in the 
number of schools and hospitals it funds." There would have been no need for public funding of 
schools and hospitals if companies were eager to undertake these socially responsible 
investments, confident that they would boost company profits.  
The empirical evidence on the no-tradeoff claim is conflicting. Some empirical studies do 
show that high corporate social responsibility is associated with high corporate financial 
performance but others do not. Moreover, empirical studies generally employ cross-section 
techniques, controlling for factors such as R&D intensity that are associated with both corporate 
social responsibility and corporate financial performance, but failing to control for other factors 
which cannot be as easily identified or measured.  
Some, most notably, Friedman (1970), have recognized the tradeoff between corporate 
social responsibility and corporate financial performance and called on corporations to focus on 
financial performance. Reich (2007) noted that corporations are bound by their obligations to 
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shareholders to pursue financial performance whether tradeoffs exist between financial 
performance and social responsibility or not. Reich concluded that prodding corporations toward 
financial responsibility is counterproductive, and urged governments to direct corporations 
toward social responsibility by regulations, not exhortations. But Pava (2008) disagreed with 
Reich, concerned that Reich's argument might lead us to "give up on the possibilities of business 
playing an important role in building a better future." (p. 811).  
The call to focus on financial performance is common in finance textbooks. Brealey et al. 
(2006) asked: “How can the financial manager help the firm’s stockholders? There is only one way,” 
they answered, “by increasing the market value of each stockholder’s stake in the firm.  The way to 
do that is to seize all investments opportunities that have a positive net present value.” (p. 24). The 
evidence of Wang et al. (2008) implies that managers apply the prescriptions in finance 
textbooks. They found a nonlinear relation between corporate philanthropy and corporate 
financial performance. Too little philanthropy detracts from financial performance, but too much 
also detracts from corporate financial performance.  
Freireich and Fulton (2009) offered a useful distinction between "impact first" and 
"financial first" investors. This distinction applies to corporate managers as well. The distinction 
relates to the willingness to accept investments with lower than normal returns.  Investments 
with normal returns leave unchanged the value of a company and the wealth of its shareholders. 
Investments with returns higher than normal returns increase value and wealth, while 
investments with returns lower than normal returns diminish value and wealth.   
Impact-first investors seek investments which maximize social or environmental impact, as 
long as financial returns exceed a floor they set. But that floor set by impact-first investors is at 
returns lower than normal returns they can obtain in equally risky alternative investments which have 
no positive social impact or even in investments which have a negative social impact. Philanthropy, 
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where donors do not even expect a return of their principal, is the extreme form of impact-first 
investing. In effect, donors set the floor at a loss of their entire donation, expecting nothing but social 
or environmental impact. In contrast, financial-first investors seek investment projects with social or 
environmental impact which exceeds a floor they set, but they invest only in projects with financial 
returns which, at a minimum, equal normal returns. For example, financial-first investors might seek 
investments in clean technology with returns which, at a minimum, equal normal returns.  
Are corporate managers impact-first managers or are they financial-first managers? Do 
managers act as financial-first managers, engaged in improving the environmental responsibility 
of their companies only when returns associated with such improvements equal or exceed normal 
returns? Do managers act as impact-first managers, engaged in improving environmental 
responsibility even when associated returns fall below normal returns? Or do managers act as 
ineffective managers, failing to engage in improving the environmental responsibility of their 
companies even when associated returns exceed normal returns, making them neither impact first 
nor financial-first managers? These are the questions we address in this study. 
We offer answers based on an examination of the relation between changes in corporate 
environmental responsibility and changes in corporate financial performance. Our measures of 
corporate environmental responsibility are the environmental rating of companies by KLD 
Research and Analytics. Our measures of corporate financial performance are return on assets 
(ROA) and Tobin’s Q. The first reflects the profitability of companies and the second reflects the 
perception of current and future profitability in the eyes of investors.  
We offer three hypotheses and begin with ROA. The first hypothesis is that increases in 
corporate environmental responsibility are followed by increases in ROA, and decreases in 
corporate environmental responsibility are followed by decreases in ROA. This is the case where 
managers are currently ineffective, acting as neither impact-first managers, nor as financial-first 
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managers. These are managers who could have increased the financial performance of their 
companies by improving environmental responsibility. We depict this hypothesis in Figure I as 
the region between A and B. These are the managers described by Russo and Fouts and by 
Guenster et al. as those who consistently underestimate the benefits of being environmentally 
responsible or overestimate its costs.  
Environmental responsibility is intangible capital. Edmans (2008) noted that managers 
might act as if they underestimate the value of intangible capital because its costs are immediately 
obvious in reductions in current earnings, while its benefits are less obvious and lie in the future. 
This is consistent with the finding of Lev et al. (2005) that investors focus on reported profitability 
measures and underestimate the benefits of R&D expenditures which are expensed immediately 
but enhance measured profitability only years later. Managerial myopia has been documented by 
Mas (2008) who found that labor unrest at Caterpillar reduced product quality, and it has been 
formalized in models by Narayanan (1985) and Stein (1988, 1989) and in a survey by Graham et 
al. (2005). Edman (2008) and Derwall et al. (2005) provide evidence consistent with managerial 
myopia. Edman (2008) showed that stocks of companies with satisfied employees earned higher 
returns than stocks of companies with less satisfied employees. Derwall et al. (2005) found that 
stocks of companies with good environmental records earned higher returns than stocks of 
companies with poor environmental records. Kempf and Osthoff (2007) found that stocks of 
companies that ranked high overall on community, diversity, employee relations, environment, 
human rights and products did better than stocks that ranked low. 
The second hypothesis is that increases in corporate environmental responsibility are 
followed by decreases in ROA and decreases in corporate environmental responsibility are 
followed by increases in ROA. This is the case where managers are impact-first managers, 
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improving corporate environmental responsibility but hurting financial performance. We depict 
this hypothesis in Figure I as the region between C and D. This hypothesis might be true if 
corporate managers invest in corporate social/environmental responsibility even when the 
benefits of investments that tilt it toward environmental responsibility fall short of the costs of 
these investments. For instance, Abowd (1989) found that increases in employee pay increase the 
costs borne by a company without increasing the benefits to shareholders. So employee gains 
come at the expense of shareholders’ returns. Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Bertrand and 
Mullainathan (2003) argued that managers might prefer to submit to employee demands for 
higher pay because higher pay fosters a more pleasant working environment for themselves, even 
though the money comes from the pockets of shareholders who gain nothing from it. Barnea and 
Rubin (2006) argued that company insiders, such as managers, are willing to engage in socially 
responsible actions whose costs exceed the benefits to shareholders because they reap private 
benefits, such as awards and other expressions of appreciation, from those promoting social 
responsibility. Barnea and Rubin found empirical support for their argument in evidence that 
insiders in companies that rank relatively high on social responsibility hold relatively small 
portions of their company shares, so they bear relatively little of the cost of accolades they 
receive for their socially responsible actions. 
 
------------------------------- 
Insert Figure I about here 
------------------------------- 
 
 In the third hypothesis, managers aim for the level of corporate environmental 
responsibility that maximizes ROA, no more than that and no less. Changes in the economy or 
society can cause discrepancy between current levels of corporate environmental responsibility 
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and levels that maximizes ROA. Managers adjust corporate environmental responsibility up or 
down to levels which maximize ROA. This is the case where managers are financial-first 
managers, willing to improve environmental responsibility but unwilling to sacrifice financial 
performance for it. If this hypothesis is true we should find that increases in corporate 
environmental responsibility are followed by increases in ROA and decreases in corporate 
environmental responsibility are also followed by increases in ROA, as managers trim 
investments which improve environmental responsibility but diminish ROA. We depict this 
hypothesis in Figure I as the region between B and C. 
Investments in corporate environmental responsibility are not likely to affect ROA 
instantaneously. Changes in ROA following changes in corporate environmental responsibility 
might well take several years. In contrast, changes in Tobin’s Q would be instantaneous if the 
stock market is perfectly efficient since stock prices can adjust instantaneously in response to 
new information. Tobin's Q is the ratio of the total value of the securities of a company, such as 
stocks and bonds, to the replacement value of its assets. Companies with high Tobin Q are 
companies that are judged by investors as having bright futures. For instance, Google has a 
higher Tobin's Q than Ford. A company’s Tobin's Q can change instantaneously as stock and 
bond prices increase if the future of a company is judged brighter or decrease if the future of the 
company is judged less bright. Toyota's Tobin's Q was high before defects were uncovered in its 
cars, and not as high later, as its stock price declined.  
Our three Tobin’s Q hypotheses are based on the premise that the stock market is not 
perfectly efficient and stock prices adjust to environmental information only with a lag. 
Therefore, the three Tobin’s Q hypotheses parallel the ROA hypotheses.  
 The three hypotheses about ROA and Tobin’s Q are formally stated as follows: 
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Hypothesis 1: Corporate managers are neither impact-first, not financial-first. 
 
Increases in corporate environmental responsibility are followed by 
increases in ROA and decreases in corporate environmental 
responsibility are followed by decreases in ROA. 
 
Increases in corporate environmental responsibility are followed by 
increases in Tobin’s Q and decreases in corporate environmental 
responsibility are followed by decreases in Tobin’s Q. 
 
 
Hypothesis 2: Corporate managers are impact-first. 
 
Increases in corporate environmental responsibility are followed by 
decreases in ROA and decreases in corporate environmental 
responsibility are followed by increases in ROA. 
 
Increases in corporate environmental responsibility are followed by 
decreases in Tobin’s Q and decreases in corporate environmental 
responsibility are followed by increases in Tobin’s Q. 
 
 
Hypothesis 3: Corporate managers are financial-first. 
 
Increases in corporate environmental responsibility are followed by 
increases in ROA and decreases in corporate environmental 
responsibility are also followed by increases in ROA. 
 
Increases in corporate environmental responsibility are followed by 
increases in Tobin’s Q and decreases in corporate environmental 
responsibility are also followed by increases in Tobin’s Q. 
 
We find strong evidence that companies that increased their levels of corporate 
environmental responsibility during a year increased their corporate financial performance, 
measured by ROA, in subsequent 3 and 5-year periods by more than companies that did not 
change their levels of corporate environmental responsibility. We also find strong evidence that 
companies that decreased their levels of corporate environmental responsibility increased their 
corporate financial performance, measured by ROA, in subsequent 3 and 5-year periods by more 
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than companies that did not change in their levels of corporate environmental responsibility. These 
findings are consistent with the financial-first hypothesis that corporate managers shift levels of 
corporate environmental responsibility up or down to maximize corporate financial performance. 
We also find evidence consistent with the financial-first hypothesis when we measure 
corporate financial performance by Tobin’s Q. We find strong evidence that companies that 
increased their environmental responsibility increased their financial performance in subsequent 
3 and 5-year periods by more than companies that did not change their levels of environmental 
responsibility. We find weaker evidence that companies that decreased their levels of corporate 
environmental responsibility increased their financial performance in subsequent 3 and 5-year 
periods by more than companies that did not change in their levels of environmental 
responsibility. These findings are also consistent with the financial-first hypothesis that managers 
shift levels of environmental responsibility up or down to maximize financial performance. 
 
The Literature 
Several studies employed cross-section analysis of levels of corporate environmental 
responsibility and corporate financial performance to uncover the relation between the two. 
Russo and Fouts (1997) used ROA of companies as their measure of corporate financial 
performance, and environmental ratings by the Franklin Research and Development Corporation 
as their measure of corporate environmental responsibility. Their data include 477 companies 
over two years, 1991 and 1992. Aware of the problem of spurious correlation between corporate 
environmental responsibility and corporate financial performance due to common factors, Russo 
and Fouts controlled for company growth rate, advertising intensity, company size, capital 
intensity, industry concentration and industry growth rate in a regression of ROA on 
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environmental ratings. They found that the coefficient of environmental ratings was positive and 
statistically significant. But it is not clear that the set of controls used by Russo and Fouts is 
complete and so we are left with the possibility that the relation between corporate 
environmental responsibility and corporate financial performance is due to missing controls. 
Moreover, the study leaves us wondering about the direction of causality between corporate 
environmental responsibility and corporate financial performance. 
Event studies have the potential to uncover the direction of causality between corporate 
environmental responsibility and corporate financial performance. Klassen and McLaughlin 
(1996) found that environmental awards to companies were followed by positive returns of their 
stocks and environmental crises were followed by negative returns. But it is hard to interpret 
these findings as evidence that increases in corporate environmental responsibility cause 
increases in corporate financial performance and decreases in corporate environmental 
responsibility cause decreases in corporate financial performance. Klassen and Mc Laughlin 
identified environmental crises from keywords such as “oil,” “chemical,” “gas leak,’” or 
“explosion” along with the words “spill” and “environment.” It is not surprising to find that news 
about an oil spill is followed by negative returns. But this finding does not necessarily imply that 
reductions in corporate environmental responsibility are followed by reductions in corporate 
financial performance. It might well be that reductions in corporate environmental responsibility 
are generally followed by increases in corporate financial performance. The negative returns of 
companies that were unfortunate enough to have a spill might be small relative to the savings of 
companies which skimped on corporate environmental responsibility but were fortunate enough 
to avoid a spill. The finding that environmental award are accompanied by positive returns might 
indicate that increases in corporate environmental responsibility are rewarded by increases in 
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corporate financial performance but it might also be that they indicate no more than the effect of 
investors drawn into buying the stock because it is in the news (See Barber and Odean, 2008). 
The 5-day window after the announcement of the award might be too short to observe reversal of 
returns.  
Hart and Ahuja (1996) and Waddock and Graves (1997) found that high corporate 
environmental responsibility correspond to high corporate financial performance but expressed 
doubts about the direction of causality. Dowell et al. (2000) employed lagged variables in an 
attempt to determine the direction of causality between corporate environmental responsibility 
and corporate financial performance but they noted the “unit root” problem in their results. 
Dowell et al. (2000) tried to overcome the problem by examining companies that experienced 
changes over time in their levels of environmental responsibility but were hampered by the small 
number of such companies. 
Analysis of changes in environmental responsibility and subsequent changes in financial 
performance has a great advantage over analysis of levels in environmental responsibility and 
contemporaneous levels of financial performance since factors such as growth rate, advertising 
intensity, company size, capital intensity, industry concentration and industry growth rate and 
possibly many unidentified factors are generally stable in a company, at least relative to other 
companies during the same period. This alleviates the concern, present in analysis of levels, that 
what we attribute to environmental responsibility should, in fact, be attributed to some 
unidentified or missing factors.  
Clarkson et al. (2011), unlike Russo and Fouts, Hart and Ahuja, and Waddock and 
Graves, studied the relation between changes in corporate environmental responsibility, 
measured by the sum of all chemicals (in pounds) released by a company into air, water and land 
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in each year, and subsequent changes in corporate financial performance, measured by 
profitability, cash flows and Tobin’s Q. They found that increases in corporate environmental 
responsibility are followed by increases in corporate financial performance and decreases in 
corporate environmental responsibility are followed by decreases in corporate financial 
performance. Why would managers ever decrease levels of corporate environmental 
responsibility or refrain from increasing them if higher levels of corporate environmental 
responsibility lead to higher levels of corporate financial performance? Clarkson et al. (2011) 
found the answer in a resource-based view of companies. Specifically, companies with 
constrained resources find it difficult to increase levels of environmental responsibility even if 
such increases lead to increases in financial performance. They found support for their 
hypothesis in evidence that companies that improved their relative environmental performance 
have higher levels of cash flows, lower leverage, higher levels of growth and higher Tobin’s Q 
immediately prior to the improvement. Our analysis, like that of Clarkson et al., focuses on 
changes rather than on levels.  
 
Data and Analysis 
Our data on corporate environmental responsibility are from the KLD database.1 Data are 
at the end of each calendar year. Since1991, KLD compiled data about approximately 650 
companies comprising the Domini 400 Social Index and S&P 500 Index. Beginning in 2001, 
                                                 
1 To date, KLD data have been used extensively in scholarly research to operationalize the CSR construct. 
Szwajkowski and Figlewicz (1999) show that KLD social ratings are not highly correlated with Fortune reputation 
data, indicating that the KLD ratings are not substantially influenced by a firm’s financial success. Some researchers 
call the KLD data “the de facto research standard” for measuring CSR in scholarly research (e.g., Waddock, 2003, 
369). However, KLD ratings as a proxy for corporate environmental performance are far from perfect. In particular, 
KLD's measure is not readily comparable across industries because of industry variations in pollution propensity, 
and variations among companies in disclosure policies. We control for industry variation in our multivariate 
regressions. 
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KLD expanded its coverage to all the companies in the Russell 1000 Index and in 2003 KLD 
expanded it further to all the companies in the Russell 3000 Index. We end our KLD period in 
2000, before the expansion of coverage, since our analysis requires several years of ROA and 
Tobin’s Q data beyond the KLD period. 
KLD rates each company on 5 indicators of environmental strength and 6 indicators of 
environmental concerns. KLD’s list of environment strengths includes:  
 
Beneficial products and services. The company derives substantial revenues from 
innovative remediation products, environmental services, or products that promote the 
efficient use of energy, or it has developed innovative products with environmental 
benefits.  
 
Pollution prevention. The company has notably strong pollution prevention programs 
including emissions reductions and toxic-use reduction programs.  
 
Recycling. The company either is a substantial user of recycled materials as raw 
materials in its manufacturing processes, or a major factor in the recycling industry.  
 
Alternative fuels. The company derives substantial revenues from alternative fuels. The 
term “alternative fuels” includes natural gas, wind power, and solar energy. The company 
has demonstrated an exceptional commitment to energy efficiency programs or the 
promotion of energy efficiency.  
 
Communications. The company is a signatory to the CERES Principles, publishes a 
notably substantive environmental report, or has notably effective internal 
communications systems in place for environmental best practices.  
 
KLD’s list of environmental concerns includes:  
 
Hazardous waste. The company's liabilities for hazardous waste sites exceed $50 
million, or the company has recently paid substantial fines or civil penalties for waste 
management violations.  
 
Regulatory problems. The company recently has paid substantial fines or civil penalties 
for violations of air, water, or other environmental regulations, or it has a pattern of 
regulatory controversies under the Clean Air Act, Clean Water Act, or other major 
environmental regulations.  
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Ozone depleting chemicals. The company is among the top manufacturers of ozone 
depleting Environmental Protection Agency chemicals such as HCFCs, methyl 
chloroform, methylene chloride, or bromines.  
 
Substantial emissions. The company's legal emissions of toxic chemicals (as defined by 
and reported to the) from individual plants into the air and water are among the highest of 
the companies followed by KLD.  
 
Agricultural chemicals. The company is a substantial producer of agricultural 
chemicals, i.e., pesticides or chemical fertilizers.  
 
Climate change. The company derives substantial revenues from the sale of coal or oil 
and its derivative fuel products, or the company derives substantial revenues indirectly 
from the combustion of coal or oil and its derivative fuel products. Such companies 
include electric utilities, transportation companies with fleets of vehicles, auto and truck 
manufacturers, and other transportation equipment companies. 
 
KLD assigns “1” when a company demonstrates strength on an indicator (e.g., pollution 
prevention) and zero if it does not. Similarly, it assigns “1”when a company’s record raises 
concern on an indicator (e.g., regulatory problems) and zero otherwise. We calculate 
environmental scores as the number of strengths minus the number of weaknesses. We calculate 
the changes in environmental scores as changes in the environmental scores relative to scores in 
the prior year.  
Our measures of corporate financial performance are Tobin’s Q and ROA. We adopt 
Chung and Pruitt’s (1994) measure of Tobin’s Q as {[Market value of common stock + Book 
value of preferred stock + Book value of long-term debt + Book value of current liabilities – 
(Book value of current assets – Book value of Inventories)] / Book value of total assets}. This 
measure of Tobin’s Q is analogous to those used in Gompers et al. (2003) and Oxelheim and 
Randøy (2003). ROA is return on assets, measured as net income before extraordinary items 
divided by total assets at the end of the year. Financial data are from Compusat. 
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We obtain 5,879 company-years between 1992 and 2000 from the KLD database. In 
addition, we use 1991 KLD data to calculate changes in environmental scores from 1991 to 
1992. If a company has no reported strength or weakness in any of five categories (Community, 
Diversity, Employee, Environment, and Product), we eliminate that company for that year. This 
elimination excludes companies for which KLD might not have analyzed information in a given 
year. This procedure leaves us with 5,537 company-years. Changes in environmental scores 
cannot be calculated for 372 company-years because companies included in one year are not 
included in the subsequent year. Data for the calculation Tobin’s Q are available for 4,104 of the 
remaining 5,165 company-years, and data for the calculation of ROA are available for 4,894 
company-years. Several additional company-years are lost when changes in Tobin’s Q and 
changes in ROA are calculated. In Panel A of Table I, we report a summary of our sampling 
process and the sample distribution by year.  
We present descriptive statistics of key variables in Panels B and C of Table I. The mean 
value of CER in the full sample is negative, indicating that on average our sample firms have 
more environmental concerns than environmental strengths. The mean value of changes in CER 
in the full sample is also negative, indicating that decrease in CER is at least as frequent in 
increase in CER. The mean and median values of Tobin’s Q for the full sample are 1.67 and 1.20 
respectively. The mean and median values of ROA for the full sample are 5.1 percent and 4.6 
percent respectively. These statistics indicate that our sample firms are on average profitable. 
 
------------------------------- 
Insert Table I about here 
------------------------------- 
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Consider a hypothetical company, ABC, whose KLD-environmental score increased 
from 2 at the end of 1995 to 3 at the end of 1996. We want to examine whether this increase in 
environmental score leads to an increase or decrease in Tobin’s Q in subsequent years (starting 
with 1997). An increase in environmental scores from the end of 1995 to the end of 1996 reflects 
an increase in environmental performance during 1996. Tobin’s Q measured at the end of 1996 
might already reflect the increase in environmental score from 1995 to 1996 and cannot serve as 
a benchmark for future changes in Tobin’s Q associated with the increase in the environmental 
score. Therefore, we use Tobin’s Q measured at the end of 1995 as the benchmark and examine 
the change in Tobin’s Q from the end of 1995 to the end of 1997 associated with the increase in 
environmental scores between the end of 1995 and the end of 1996. We refer to this change in 
Tobin’s Q as F1Q, to denote a change in Tobin’s Q one year into the future. We refer to the 
change in Tobin’s Q three years into the future, through the end of 1999, as F3Q. Similarly F5Q 
denotes the change in Tobin’s Q five years into the future, through the end of 2001. We use F0Q 
to denote the change in Tobin’s Q from the end of 1995 to the end of 1996. Changes in ROA are 
similarly measured and referred to as F0ROA, F1ROA, F3ROA, and F5ROA. F0ROA is the 
change in ROA from 1995 to 1996. F1ROA is the change in ROA from 1995 to the average 
ROA in 1996 and 1997. F3ROA is the change from ROA in 1995 to the average ROA in 1996, 
1997, 1998 and 1999. F5ROA is the change from ROA in 1995 to the average ROA in 1996, 
1997, 1998, 1999, 2000 and 2001. 
We begin with an examination of the relation between levels of corporate environmental 
responsibility and levels of corporate financial performance to confirm the positive correlation 
between the two, documented in earlier studies. We compare Tobin’s Q of companies with 
negative environmental scores (i.e., firms with more concerns than strengths) to those of 
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companies with positive environmental scores (i.e., firms with more strengths than concerns). 
We make a similar comparison by ROA. We denote by year(0) the year when the environmental 
score is measured and examine its relation to Tobin’s Q and ROA from year(-5), five years 
before year(0), through year(5), five years after. The results are reported in Table II. 
 
------------------------------- 
Insert Table II about here 
------------------------------- 
 
 
 Tobin’s Q is higher for companies with positive environmental scores than for 
companies with negative scores not only in year(0), but also in years prior to and subsequent to 
year(0). Differences in Tobin’s Q between companies with positive environmental scores and 
companies with negative scores are statistically significant at the 1 percent level based on t-test 
and Wilcoxon rank sum test for all years under investigation. We find similar results for ROA. 
Differences in ROA are statistically significant for all years except year(-5). However, an 
analysis of levels cannot identify causality. Such identification requires analysis of changes. 
We present the analysis of the relation between changes in corporate environmental 
responsibility and subsequent changes in Tobin’s Q and ROA in Table III. We find that companies 
that increased their levels of corporate environmental responsibility experienced an increase in 
their Tobin’s Q in the following 1, 3, and 5 years relative to companies that had no change in their 
levels of corporate environmental responsibility. Similarly, we find that companies that decreased 
their levels of corporate environmental responsibility experienced an increase in their Tobin’s Q 
relative to companies that had no change in their levels of corporate environmental responsibility. 
Differences are statistically significant. The differences between firms that increase CER and those 
that do not change CER are statistically significant at the 1 percent level based on t-test and 
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Wilcoxon rank sum test. The differences between firms that decrease CER and those that do not 
change CER are also significant at the 1 percent level based on t-test and Wilcoxon rank sum test.    
 
------------------------------- 
Insert Table III about here 
------------------------------- 
 
The results of the analysis of the relation between changes in corporate environmental 
responsibility and changes in subsequent ROA are similar to those of changes in Tobin’s Q. 
Companies that increased their levels of corporate environmental responsibility and companies 
that decreased their levels of corporate environmental responsibility increased their ROA in 
subsequent years relative to companies that did not change their levels of corporate 
environmental responsibility. Differences are statistically significant at the 1 percent or 5 percent 
level based on t-test and Wilcoxon rank sum test.2  
Although analysis of changes as opposed to levels alleviates concerns about the proper 
control for unidentified or missing factors that influence environment responsibility as well as 
financial performance, univariate analyses in Table II may still suffer from the omitted correlated 
variable problem. Thus, we run multivariate regressions to rule out the possibility of the lack of 
controls and omitted variables contributing to the results in Table III. We regress the natural 
logarithm of subsequent changes in Tobin’s Q on the indicator for the group of firms that 
increase CER, D1, the indicator for the group of firms that decrease CER, D2, and a set of 
control variables. Control variables include R&D intensity in year (-1) (Hirschey, 1982; 
Cockburn and Griliches, 1988; Cohen and Klepper, 1992), advertising expense scaled by sales in 
                                                 
2 We also repeat our univaraite analysis by year and by industry group and find the results that are qualitatively 
similar to those reported in Tables II and III. 
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year (-1) (Hirschey, 1982), average of annual percentage growth rate in sales (Hirschey, 1982), 
firm size, and industry indicators. More specifically, we estimate the following regression model: 
LN(FtQ) = β1 + β2D1 + β3D2 + β4RD_1 + β5AD_1 + β6ASGROt + β7SIZE_1  
          + Industry dummies + e                 (1) 
where LN(FtQ) is the natural logarithm of changes in Tobin’s Q from year(-1) to year(t) where t 
= 0, 1, 3, and 5; D1 is an indicator variable that takes a value of one if changes in CER<0, and 
zero otherwise; D2 is an indicator variable that takes a value of one if changes in CER>0, and 
zero otherwise; RD_1 is R&D expense divided by sales for year(-1). AD_1 is advertising 
expense divided by sales for year(-1); ASGROt is the average of annual percentage growth rate 
in sales over year(-1) to year(t) where t = 0, 1, 3, and 5; and SIZE_1 is the natural logarithm of 
total assets at the end of year(-1). Industry dummies are based on Campbell’s (1996) twelve-
industry classification.  
The intercept captures changes in Tobin’s Q for firms that do not change CER. The 
coefficient on D1 captures the difference in changes in Tobin’s Q between firms that decrease 
CER and those that do not change CER, while the coefficient on D2 captures the difference 
between firms that increase CER and those that do not change CER. We report the results in 
Table IV. Consistent with the results reported in Table III, we find positive and statistically 
significant (at the 1 percent or 5 percent levels) coefficients on D1 and D2 for subsequent years 
1, 3, and 5, indicating that firms decreasing or increasing CER perform better than firms that do 
not change CER. 
------------------------------- 
Insert Table IV about here 
------------------------------- 
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We also regress subsequent changes in ROA on the indicator for the group of firms that 
decrease CER, D1, the indicator for the group of firms that increase CER, D2, and a set of 
control variables. Control variables in the regression of ROA change include average of annual 
percentage growth rate in sales (Rangan, 1998; Jo et al., 2007), average annual percentage 
growth rate in capital expenditure (Rangan, 1998; Jo et al., 2007), the firm size, and industry 
indicators. We estimate the following regression model: 
 FtROA = β1 + β2D1 + β3D2 + β4ASGROt + β5ACAPGRt + β6SIZE_1  
          + Industry dummies + e                 (2) 
where FtROA is the changes in ROA, averaged over the current and subsequent t years 
where t=0, 1, 3, and 5 and ACAPGRt is the average of annual percentage growth rate in capital 
expenditures over year(-1) to year(t) where t = 0, 1, 3, and 5. Other variables are as defined 
earlier. 
Again consistent with the results reported in Table III, we find that positive and 
statistically significant (at the 1 percent or 5 percent levels) coefficients on D1 and D2 for 
subsequent years 1, 3, and 5, except the coefficient on D1 being insignificant for year 1. These 
results are consistent with the financial-first hypothesis that managers change levels of corporate 
environmental responsibility to maximize corporate financial performance, increasing levels of 
corporate environmental responsibility when they are too low and decreasing them when they are 
too high. 
Our results require no reliance on a resource-based view of companies. They are 
consistent with a world where companies have access to resources necessary for increases or 
decreases in levels of corporate environmental responsibility and choose increases and decreases 
that maximize levels of corporate financial performance. The resource-based hypothesis is the 
claim that companies with relatively high levels of corporate financial performance are more 
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likely to increase corporate environmental responsibility than companies with low levels of 
corporate financial performance and that companies that experienced increases in levels of 
corporate financial performance are more likely to increase their levels of corporate 
environmental responsibility than companies that experienced decreases in their levels of 
corporate financial performance.  
We find that companies with higher levels of corporate financial performance, whether 
ROA or Q, are no more likely to increase subsequent corporate environmental responsibility than 
companies with lower levels of corporate financial performance. Table V shows the relation 
between levels of ROA in one year and changes in corporate environmental responsibility in the 
following year. Similarly, Table V shows the relation between levels of Tobin’s Q in one year 
and changes in corporate environmental responsibility in the following year. We see that the 
proportion of companies that increased their corporate environmental responsibility is unrelated 
to preceding levels of corporate financial performance. The differences in frequency of firm-
years that decrease, do not change, and increase CER in the following year between firms with 
better financial performance and those with lower levels of financial performance are not 
statistically significant at the conventional levels based on Chi-square test.   
 
------------------------------- 
Insert Table V about here 
------------------------------- 
 
We also examine whether changes in corporate financial performance are associated with 
subsequent changes in corporate environmental responsibility. Consider the ABC company 
example, where a corporate environmental responsibility change is measured as the change from 
the end of 1995 to the end of 1996. We refer the change in Q from 1992 to 1995 as P3Q. 
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Similarly we refer to a change in Q from 1990 to 1995 as P5Q. Changes in ROA are measured 
similarly. P3ROA is the change from the average ROA in 1992, 1993 and 1994 to the ROA in 
1995. P5ROA is the change from the average ROA in 1990, 1991, 1992, 1993 and 1994, to the 
ROA in 1995. We find that companies with improved corporate financial performance, measured 
by changes in Tobin’s Q are no more likely to increase subsequent corporate environmental 
responsibility by more than companies with deteriorated Tobin’s Q. The differences in frequency 
of firm-years that decrease, do not change, and increase CER in the year following changes in 
Tobin’s Q between firms that improve and those that deteriorate Tobin’s Q are not statistically 
significant at the conventional levels based on Chi-square test. However, we find that companies 
with improved corporate financial performance, measured by changes in ROA, are more likely 
to increase corporate environmental responsibility than companies with deteriorated ROA. (See 
Table VI) 
 
------------------------------- 
Insert Table VI about here 
------------------------------- 
 
 
Conclusion 
Proponents of corporate environmental responsibility often portray corporate managers as 
people who resist investment in corporate environmental responsibility despite its positive 
contribution to corporate financial performance. Opponents of corporate environmental 
responsibility are usually concerned that corporate managers invest too much in corporate 
environmental responsibility, diminishing benefits to shareholders while garnering accolades for 
themselves as stewards of the environment. We find that neither the portrayal of proponents of 
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corporate environmental responsibility nor the concerns of opponents of corporate environmental 
responsibility are consistent with the evidence.  
We study the relation between changes in corporate environmental responsibility, 
measured by changes in KLD’s environmental scores, and subsequent changes in corporate 
financial performance, measured by changes in Tobin’s Q and ROA. We find evidence 
consistent with the hypothesis that corporate managers act in the interest of shareholders, 
adjusting corporate environmental responsibility up or down to enhance corporate financial 
performance. Specifically, we find that both companies that increased their levels of corporate 
environmental responsibility and corporations which decreased these levels enjoyed subsequent 
increases in corporate financial performance that exceeded those of companies that did not 
change their levels of corporate environmental responsibility. We also find that companies that 
experienced increases in ROA were more likely to increase subsequent levels of corporate 
environmental responsibility by more than companies that experienced decreases in ROA. This 
finding suggests that enhancements in corporate financial resources, reflected in increased ROA, 
facilitate enhancements of corporate environmental responsibility. 
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Table I. Description of the Data 
 
Panel A: Sample Selection and Distribution 
 
    Less:   Less:     
Year  
Number of 
companies in the 
KLD database  
Companies with 
no reported 
strengths or 
concerns in any 
social category 
Companies with at 
least one strength or 
concern in any 
social characteristic  
Companies 
with 
unavailable 
score changes  
Companies with 
available score 
changes  
Companies 
with  
Tobin’s Q 
at year(0) 
Companies 
with  ROA 
at  year(0) 
            
1992  652  87 565  15 550  434 527 
1993  651  50 601  12 589  464 559 
1994  643  27 616  13 603  476 570 
1995  648  29 619  47 572  456 535 
1996  652  41 611  48 563  450 535 
1997  653  31 622  62 560  445 530 
1998  658  30 628  69 559  446 528 
1999  662  24 638  51 587  469 555 
2000  660  23 637  55 582  464 555 
            
Total over 1992-2000 5,879  342 5,537  372 5,165  4,104 4,894 
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Table I continued: 
Panel B: Descriptive Statistics by Year 
 
  CER  Changes in CER  Q (0)  ROA (0) 
Year  N Mean Median  N Mean Median  N Mean Median  N Mean Median 
1992  527 -0.2391 0  527 -0.2391 0  434 1.4588 1.0707  527 0.0463 0.0410 
1993  559 -0.2451 0  559 -0.0250 0  464 1.4657 1.1536  559 0.0460 0.0417 
1994  570 -0.2491 0  570 -0.0316 0  476 1.3321 1.0661  570 0.0542 0.0477 
1995  535 -0.1570 0  535 0.0654 0  456 1.5208 1.2040  535 0.0550 0.0519 
1996  535 -0.0953 0  535 0.0505 0  449 1.5955 1.2718  535 0.0510 0.0497 
1997  530 -0.0792 0  530 0.0151 0  445 1.8322 1.4555  530 0.0483 0.0486 
1998  528 -0.0455 0  528 0.0322 0  446 1.9722 1.3026  528 0.0447 0.0422 
1999  555 -0.1676 0  555 -0.1315 0  469 1.9673 1.2453  555 0.0589 0.0460 
2000  555 -0.1622 0  555 -0.0144 0  464 1.9153 1.1852  555 0.0529 0.0433 
Total  4894 -0.1612 0  4894 -0.0311 0  4103 1.6728 1.1992  4894 0.0509 0.0462 
 
 
Panel C: Descriptive Statistics by Industry 
 
  CER  Changes in CER  Tobin's Q  ROA 
Industry  N Mean Median  N Mean Median  N Mean Median  N Mean Median 
Agriculture, forestry, and fishing  4 -1.0000 -1  4 -0.2500 0  4 3.6999 3.7280  4 0.1518 0.1542 
Mining, construction,   214 -0.4206 0  214 -0.0794 0  185 1.3673 1.2784  214 0.0069 0.0260 
Light manufactured products  1176 -0.4184 0  1176 -0.0536 0  1131 1.9770 1.5089  1176 0.0754 0.0710 
Heavy manufactured products  1320 -0.1000 0  1320 -0.0205 0  1255 1.6579 1.1843  1320 0.0562 0.0571 
Transportation, communications, and utilities  740 -0.1284 0  740 -0.0554 0  678 1.0105 0.9164  740 0.0348 0.0368 
Wholesale and retail trade  525 0.0705 0  525 -0.0019 0  514 1.7595 1.3766  525 0.0602 0.0646 
Finance, insurance, and real estate  593 0.0287 0  593 0.0084 0  54 1.3687 1.0208  593 0.0192 0.0125 
Service Industries  246 0.0163 0  246 -0.0081 0  225 2.1885 1.4331  246 0.0501 0.0521 
Other services  49 0.0612 0  49 0.0204 0  48 2.2182 1.5290  49 0.0442 0.0478 
Public administration and other  27 -1.3704 -1  27 -0.2222 0  9 1.8580 1.7908  27 0.0318 0.0288 
Total  4894 -0.1612 0  4894 -0.0311 0  4103 1.6728 1.1992  4894 0.0509 0.0462 
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Table I continued: 
We begin with 5,879 company-years. We exclude companies with no reported strength or concern in any of five social responsibility categories 
(Community, Diversity, Employee, Environment, and Product). This leaves 5,537 company- years. We calculate the change in the environmental 
scores of a company as the change in the environmental scores relative to the pervious year. We could not calculate changes in environmental 
scores for 372 company-years when companies appear in only one of two consecutive years. Data for the calculation of Tobin’s Q are available for 
4,104 company- years, and data for the calculation of return on assets (ROA) are available for 4,894 company-years.  
 
We calculate corporate environmental responsibility (CER) as the number of environmental strengths minus the number of environmental 
concerns. We calculate Tobin’s Q as {[Market value of common stock + Book value of preferred stock + Book value of long-term debt + Book 
value of current liabilities – (Book value of current assets – Book value of Inventories)] / Book value of total assets} at the end of each year. ROA 
is return on assets measured as net income before extraordinary items divided by total assets at the end of the year. Year(0) is the year that the 
environment score is measured. Q(0) is Tobin’s Q in the current year (when CER is measured). ROA(0) is ROA in the current year (when CER is 
measured). 
 
In Panels B and C, we provide descriptive statistics of CER, Changes in CER, and ROA based on 4,894 company-years. Descriptive statistics of 
Tobin’s Q are based on 4.104 company-years. 
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Table II. The Relation between Levels of Corporate Environmental Responsibility (CER) and Levels of Corporate Financial 
Performance in Concurrent, Preceding and Subsequent Years 
 
Panel A: The Relation between Levels of CER and Levels of Tobin’s Q in Concurrent, Preceding and Subsequent Years 
 
 Mean Q for companies with positive and negative CER  Median Q for companies with positive and negative CER 
 Positive CER Negative CER Mean t-test  Positive CER Negative CER Median Wilcoxon rank sum 
 in year (0) in year (0) Difference significance  in year (0) in year (0) Difference test significance 
Q(-5) 1.3472 1.1518 0.1954 ***  1.0928 0.9330 0.1598 *** 
Q(-3) 1.4028 1.2225 0.1803 ***  1.1437 0.9942 0.1495 *** 
Q(-1) 1.4528 1.2798 0.1730 ***  1.1406 1.0349 0.1057 *** 
Q(0) 1.4763 1.2905 0.1858 ***  1.1609 1.0401 0.1208 *** 
Q(1) 1.4853 1.3037 0.1816 ***  1.1554 1.0475 0.1079 *** 
Q(3) 1.5083 1.3188 0.1895 ***  1.1489 1.0413 0.1076 *** 
Q(5) 1.5560 1.3134 0.2426 ***  1.1554 1.0219 0.1335 *** 
 
 
Panel B: The Relation between Levels of CER and Levels of ROA in Concurrent, Preceding and Subsequent Years 
 
 Mean ROA for companies with positive and negative CER  Median ROA for companies with positive and negative CER 
 Positive CER Negative CER Mean t-test  Positive CER Negative CER Median Wilcoxon rank sum 
 in year (0) in year (0) Difference significance  in year (0) in year (0) Difference test significance 
ROA(-5) 0.0539 0.0507 0.0032   0.0470 0.0468 0.0002 * 
ROA(-3) 0.0559 0.0451 0.0108 ***  0.0491 0.0425 0.0066 *** 
ROA(-1) 0.0511 0.0408 0.0103 ***  0.0450 0.0395 0.0055 *** 
ROA(0) 0.0495 0.0419 0.0076 ***  0.0439 0.0407 0.0032 *** 
ROA(1) 0.0482 0.0418 0.0064 ***  0.0438 0.0402 0.0036 *** 
ROA(3) 0.0469 0.0406 0.0063 **  0.0436 0.0386 0.0050 *** 
ROA(5) 0.0492 0.0410 0.0082 ***  0.0441 0.0365 0.0076 *** 
 
*** Significant at the 0.01 level. 
  ** Significant at the 0.05 level. 
    * Significant at the 0.10 level. 
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Table II continued: 
In Panel A, the number of observations ranges from 625 to 792 for the positive CER group and from 813 to 990 for the negative CER group. In 
Panel B, the number of observations ranges from 666 to 842 for the positive CER group and from 905 to 1,102 for the negative CER group. 
 
We calculate corporate environmental responsibility (CER) as the number of environmental strengths minus the number of environmental concerns. 
We calculate Tobin’s Q as {[Market value of common stock + Book value of preferred stock + Book value of long-term debt + Book value of 
current liabilities – (Book value of current assets – Book value of Inventories)] / Book value of total assets} at the end of each year. ROA is return 
on assets measured as net income before extraordinary items divided by total assets at the end of the year. Year(0) is the year that the environment 
score is measured. All other years are similarly indexed relative to year(0). Q(0) is Tobin’s Q in the current year (when CER is measured). Q(-5) is 
Tobin’s Q five years earlier. Q(-3) is Tobin’s Q three years earlier. Q(-1) is Tobin’s Q one year earlier. Q(5) is Tobin’s Q five years later. Q(3) is 
Tobin’s Q three years later. Q(1) is Tobin’s Q one year later. ROA(0) is ROA in the current year (when CER is measured). ROA(-5) is the mean 
ROA during the preceding five years. ROA(-3) is the mean ROA during the preceding three years. ROA(-1) is the mean ROA during the 
preceding year. ROA(5) is the mean ROA during the subsequent five years. ROA(3) is the mean ROA during the subsequent three years. ROA(1) 
is the mean ROA during the subsequent year. 
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Table III. The Relation between Changes in Corporate Environmental Responsibility (CER) and Subsequent Changes in 
Corporate Financial Performance 
 
Panel A: The Relation between Changes in CER and Subsequent Changes in Tobin’s Q 
 
 
Differences between changes in Q when CER 
increases and when it is unchanged  
Differences between changes in Q when CER  
decreases and when it is unchanged 
 Mean t-test Median Wilcoxon test  Mean t-test Median Wilcoxon rank sum 
Variables Difference significance Difference significance  Difference significance Difference test significance 
F0Q 0.0756 *** 0.0198 **  0.0180  0.0135  
F1Q 0.1005 *** 0.0429 ***  0.0403  0.0505 *** 
F3Q 0.1803 *** 0.0505 ***  0.0659  0.0694 *** 
F5Q 0.1826 *** 0.0785 ***  0.0930 * 0.0738 *** 
 
 
 
Panel B: The Relation between Changes in CER and Subsequent Changes in ROA 
 
 
Differences between changes in ROA when CER 
increases and when it is unchanged  
Differences between changes in ROA when CER  
decreases and when it is unchanged 
 Mean t-test Median Wilcoxon test  Mean t-test Median Wilcoxon rank sum 
Variables Difference significance Difference significance  Difference significance Difference test significance 
F0ROA 0.0066 ** 0.0019 **  0.0047 * 0.0028 *** 
F1ROA 0.0059 *** 0.0023 **  0.0037 * 0.0033 *** 
F3ROA 0.0069 *** 0.0016 ***  0.0068 *** 0.0030 *** 
F5ROA 0.0088 *** 0.0053 ***  0.0082 *** 0.0045 *** 
 
 
*** Significant at the 0.01 level. 
  ** Significant at the 0.05 level. 
    * Significant at the 0.10 level. 
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Table III continued: 
In Panel A, the number of observations ranges from 302 to 377 for the CER increase group, from 2,610 to 3,295 for the no change in CER group 
and from 303 to 385 for the CER decrease group. In Panel B, the number of observations ranges from 353 to 406 for the CER increase group, from 
3,248 to 3,859 for the no change in CER group and from 351 to 406 for the CER decrease group. 
 
We calculate the changes in corporate environmental responsibility (CER changes) as the changes in the environmental scores from the previous year, 
where the environmental scores are calculated as the number of strengths minus the number of weaknesses in environment area. We calculate Tobin’s 
Q as {[Market value of common stock + Book value of preferred stock + Book value of long-term debt + Book value of current liabilities – (Book 
value of current assets – Book value of Inventories)] / Book value of total assets} at the end of each year. ROA is return on assets measured as net 
income before extraordinary items divided by total assets at the end of the year. Year(0) is the year that the changes in environmental score is 
measured from the previous year (i.e., year(-1)). All subsequent and concurrent changes in Tobin’s Q and ROA are measured as the changes from 
year(-1). F0ROA is the change in ROA in the current year from the previous year (i.e., year(-1)). F1ROA is the change in ROA, averaged over the 
current and the following year, from ROA in year(-1). F3ROA is the change in ROA, averaged over the current and subsequent three years, from 
year(-1). F5ROA is the change in ROA, averaged over the current and subsequent five years, from ROA in year(-1). Differences between changes in 
Q (ROA) when CER increases and when it is unchanged are calculated as changes in Q (ROA) when CER increases minus changes in Q (ROA) 
when CER is unchanged. Differences between changes in Q (ROA) when CER decreases and when it is unchanged are calculated as changes in Q 
(ROA) when CER decreases minus changes in Q (ROA) when CER is unchanged. 
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Table IV: Multivariate Regression of Subsequent Changes in Corporate Financial Performance on Changes in Corporate 
Environmental Responsibility (CER) 
 
Panel A: Regression of Subsequent Changes in Tobin’s Q 
 
Dependent variables LN(F0Q)  LN(F1Q)  LN(F3Q)  LN(F5Q) 
 Parameter  Parameter  Parameter  Parameter  
 estimates t-value p-value estimates t-value p-value estimates t-value p-value estimates t-value p-value
Intercept -0.1180 -2.99 0.0028  -0.2010 -3.66 0.0003  -0.2064 -2.91 0.0036  -0.3219 -4.08 <.0001
D1 0.0140 0.81 0.4185  0.0509 2.11 0.0348  0.0682 2.20 0.0281  0.0714 2.07 0.0385 
D2 0.0323 1.88 0.0602  0.0507 2.12 0.0337  0.0902 2.93 0.0034  0.0916 2.68 0.0074 
RD_1 0.7681 6.07 <.0001  0.8456 4.81 <.0001  0.5057 2.23 0.0256  0.3484 1.38 0.1662 
AD_1 -0.0583 -0.37 0.7127  0.1070 0.49 0.6268  0.6476 2.29 0.0224  1.3404 4.26 <.0001
ASGROt 0.0161 0.76 0.4481  0.0097 0.27 0.7883  0.1665 2.60 0.0093  0.1007 1.18 0.2372 
SIZE_1 0.0098 2.59 0.0097  0.0135 2.56 0.0104  0.0119 1.75 0.0802  0.0212 2.80 0.0051 
  
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
  
Adjusted R2 0.0148 0.0130 0.0158 0.0200 
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Table IV continued: 
Panel B: Regression of Subsequent Changes in ROA 
 
Dependent variables F0ROA  F1ROA  F3ROA  F5ROA 
 Parameter  Parameter  Parameter  Parameter  
 estimates t-value p-value estimates t-value p-value estimates t-value p-value estimates t-value p-value
Intercept -0.0169 -2.17 0.0299  -0.0177 -2.32 0.0202  -0.0269 -3.32 0.0009  -0.0313 -3.76 0.0002 
D1 0.0005 0.14 0.8870  0.0038 1.08 0.2818  0.0078 2.07 0.0383  0.0081 2.13 0.0332 
D2 0.0047 1.27 0.2028  0.0081 2.28 0.0226  0.0116 3.10 0.0020  0.0098 2.59 0.0097 
ASGROt 0.0125 2.76 0.0057  0.0141 2.56 0.0106  0.0172 2.10 0.0359  0.0241 2.36 0.0181 
ACAPGRt -0.0004 -0.20 0.8378  0.0063 2.48 0.0131  0.0176 4.07 <.0001  0.0166 2.87 0.0042 
SIZE_1 0.0006 0.80 0.4254  0.0006 0.82 0.4113  0.0011 1.41 0.1589  0.0016 2.00 0.0455 
  
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
  
Adjusted R2 0.0018 0.0070 0.0147 0.0145 
  
 
This table shows the results of multivariate regressions. We regress subsequent changes in Tobin’s Q on changes in CER and control variables in 
Panel A. In Panel B, we regress subsequent changes in ROA on changes in CER and control variables. LN(FtQ) is the natural logarithm of 
changes in Tobin’s Q from year(-1) to year(t) where t = 0, 1, 3, and 5. D1 is an indicator variable that takes a value of one if changes 
in CER<0, and zero otherwise. D2 is an indicator variable that takes a value of one if changes in CER>0, and zero otherwise. RD_1 is 
R&D expense divided by sales for year(-1). AD_1 is advertising expense divided by sales for year(-1). ASGROt is the average of annual 
percentage growth rate in sales over year(-1) to year(t) where t = 0, 1, 3, and 5. SIZE_1 is the natural logarithm of total assets at the end of year(-
1). FtROA is the changes in ROA, averaged over the current and subsequent t years where t=0, 1, 3, and 5. ACAPGRt is the average of annual 
percentage growth rate in capital expenditures over year(-1) to year(t) where t = 0, 1, 3, and 5. Industry dummies are based on Campbell’s (1996) 
twelve-industry classification. 
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Table V. The Relation between Levels of Corporate Financial Performance and 
Subsequent Changes in Corporate Environmental Responsibility (CER) 
 
 
   Frequency of company-years  
Chi-square test of differences 
in frequency between decreases 
 Levels of   Subsequent changes in CER  and increases in CER 
Q and ROA  decrease No change increase  test statistic (p-value) 
PLQ(-6) 
< median  244 1,544 240  0.33 (0.5660) 
>= median  142 1727 128   
        
PLQ(-4) 
< median  241 1,584 230  0.05 (0.8317) 
>= median  139 1,733 137   
        
PLROA5 
< median  230 1,962 240  0.78 (0.3762) 
>= median  195 2,071 180   
        
PLROA3 
< median  230 2,001 244  1.33 (0.2485) 
>= median  200 2,090 181   
 
 
This table shows the frequency of company-years of levels of corporate financial performance and 
subsequent changes in CER. We calculate the changes in environmental score relative to the pervious 
year. We calculate Tobin’s Q as {[Market value of common stock + Book value of preferred stock + 
Book value of long-term debt + Book value of current liabilities – (Book value of current assets – Book 
value of Inventories)] / Book value of total assets} at the end of each year. ROA is return on assets 
measured as net income before extraordinary items divided by total assets at the end of the year. Year(0) 
is the year that the environment score is measured. PLQ(-6) is Tobin’s Q six years earlier. PLQ(-4) is 
Tobin’s Q four years earlier. PLROA5 is the average ROA over the past five years ending two years 
earlier. PLROA3 is the average ROA over the past three years ending two years earlier. 
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Table VI: The Relation between Changes in Corporate Financial Performance and 
Subsequent Changes in Corporate Environmental Responsibility (CER) 
 
 
   Frequency of company-years  
Chi-square test of differences 
in frequency between decreases 
Changes in   Subsequent changes in CER  and increases in CER 
Q and ROA  decrease no change increase  test statistic (p-value) 
P5Q 
< median  187 1,589 179  0.02 (0.8833) 
>= median  184 1,576 180   
        
P3Q 
< median  189 1,637 186  0.11 (0.7358) 
>= median  189 1,612 177   
        
P5ROA 
< median  241 1,999 205  5.31 (0.0212) 
>= median  182 2,015 213   
        
P3ROA 
< median  237 2,033 205  3.93 (0.0474) 
>= median  191 2,035 217   
 
 
This table shows the frequency of company-years of the changes in corporate financial performance and 
subsequent changes in CER. We calculate the changes in environmental score relative to the pervious 
year. We calculate Tobin’s Q as {[Market value of common stock + Book value of preferred stock + 
Book value of long-term debt + Book value of current liabilities – (Book value of current assets – Book 
value of Inventories)] / Book value of total assets} at the end of each year. ROA is return on assets 
measured as net income before extraordinary items divided by total assets at the end of the year. Year(0) 
is the year that the environment score is measured. All changes in Tobin’s Q and ROA are measured as 
changes relative to year(-1). P5Q is the change in Tobin’s Q in year(-1) from Tobin’s Q five years earlier 
. P3Q is the change in Tobin’s Q in year(-1) from Tobin’s Q three years earlier. P5ROA is the change in 
ROA in year(-1) from the average ROA during the preceding five years. P5ROA is the change in ROA in 
year(-1) from the average ROA during the preceding three years. 
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Figure I 
The Relation between Corporate Environmental Responsibility and Corporate Financial 
Performance 
 
 
 
 
 
 
